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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH MORITSKY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Case No. 880395 CA 
Jurisdiction for review is conferred upon this court by 
Section 78-2(a)-3, Utah Code Ann., and Article 8, Sections 4 and 
9, Utah State Constitution. 
Defendant herein was charged with aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., Section 
76-5-103, and was convicted in a jury trial on July 23, 1987, in 
the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Uintah County, 
State of Utah. 
DATED this "Z3 day of August, 1988. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff and : 
Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH MORITZSKY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. : 
Case No. 880395 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. 
Whether trial counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and if 
so, whether counsel's performance was prejudicial to the 
defendant, thereby denying his right to effective assistance of 
counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Joseph Moritzsky was charged with aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-5-103. 
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial held July 23, 
1987, in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Uintah 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis Draney, presiding. 
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Draney to be confined in the 
Utah State Prison for a term of not more than five years. 
Execution of the prison sentence was suspended and the defendant 
was placed on probation for a period of eighteen months on the 
conditions and terms that: 
(1) he enter into and abide by terms of a probation 
agreement with the Department of Corrections; 
(2) that the defendant violate no laws of the United 
States, State of Utah or any municipality during the term of the 
probation; 
(3) that the defendant serve one year in the Uintah 
County jail; 
(4) that the defendant submit himself to and complete 
any psychological evaluation as requested by the Department of 
Corrections and participate in counselling and therapy as 
required by said Department, and pay appropriate restitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about April 1, 1987, defendant was residing in a 
trailer in Uintah County, State of Utah. Tr. at 128, 130. Late 
that afternoon, the defendant had several visitors at his 
trailer. One of the visitors was Gary Olsen, the defendant's 
partner is a horse-breaking venture. Tr. at 54. The defendant 
invited Mr. Olsen, and several other individuals inside the 
trailer for a drink. Tr. at 133. Shortly thereafter, the 
defendant's other guests left the trailer, but Mr. Olsen 
remained. Tr. at 64. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Olsen informed the 
defendant that he was going to take home the mare which the 
defendant had been breaking. TR at 60, 134. The defendant then 
told Mr. Olsen that he would not let him take the mare home. TR 
at 60, 135. The defendant then went inside the trailer, just 
before dark. TR at 135. The defendant testified that shortly 
after he went to sleep, he could feel the trailer moving and 
heard a noise in the trailer. He left the bedroom of the trailer 
to find that Mr. Olsen had broken the rope which was securing the 
outside door of the trailer, and Olsen was in his trailer. Tr. 
at 136-137. The defendant and Mr. Olsen struggled and defendant 
pushed Mr. Olsen out of the trailer door and onto the ground. 
Tr. at 165. Mr. Olsen testified that he then immediately went 
back into the trailer and upon doing so, saw the defendant go to 
get his gun. TR at 62. The defendant fired several shots toward 
Mr. Olsen's feet, and one bullet hit Mr. Olsen's foot. Olsen 
then left the camp trailer, but remained outside for 
approximately twenty minutes. TR at 70. The defendant remained 
in his trailer for an additional period of time, and then went 
outside and gave Mr. Olsen a ride to his home. TR at 72. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Joseph Moritzsky claims that he was denied 
his right to effective assistance of counsel at his trial because 
his attorney did not request jury instructions affording him the 
statutory presumption that his use of force was reasonable, as 
the victim's entry into his trailer home was unlawful and 
forcible. 
In support of his contention, defendant relies upon the 
testimony of the victim, Gary Olsen, who testified that the 
defendant physically removed him from defendant's trailer, and 
Mr. Olsen again re-entered the trailer in a forceful manner. 
Defendant asserts that his attorney's failure to argue 
the statutory presumption of reasonableness in the defense of 
habitation statute made proper application of his statutory 
defense impossible. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND BY ARTICLE ONE, SECTION TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
STATE CONSTITUTION. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 
2052 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established the 
standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial. In order to prevail, the defendant must 
satisfy a two pronged test. First, he must demonstrate that 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. Second, he must show that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. I_d. at 690. In 
Codianna v. Morris, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Strickland 
standard. 660 P.2d 1101, 1108-09 (Utah 1983). See also, State 
v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986), State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645 
(Utah 1985) . 
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the 
defendant must show that "specific, identified acts or omissions 
fall outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance." Frame at 405. The defendant herein contends that 
trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction containing 
the statutory defense of habitation presumption found in section 
76-2-405(2), Utah Code Ann., constitutes a gross omission which 
falls below the standard of professionally competent assistance. 
Further, trial counsel's failure to request an instruction or to 
argue for a finding that the entry into the defendant's home was 
unlawful and forcible is also an omission which demonstrates that 
counsel's performance was deficient. A review of the facts of 
this case demonstrates the vital significance of the legal 
presumption of reasonableness. 
The defendant testified that after he went to bed, he 
felt the trailer move and heard a noise. Upon going into the 
other room of the trailer, he saw Olsen in his trailer. Tr. at 
136-137. He further testified that to gain entry into his 
trailer home, Olsen had broken a rope which secured the door. 
Tr. at 137. Defendant and Olsen struggled and defendant pushed 
him out the door. Indeed, the uncontroverted testimony of the 
defendant and that of the "victim", Olsen, was that Olsen 
re-entered the defendant's home, again, after defendant had 
pushed him out of the door of the trailer. Tr. at 61, 139. It 
was the physical confrontation and Olsen's re-entry of the 
trailer that caused defendant to get his gun and fire it several 
times towards Olsen's feet. Tr. at 62, 140. 
In 1985, the legislature amended the Utah statute 
respecting the defense of habitation, Utah Code Ann. Section 
76-2-405, to add the legal presumption found in Section 
76-2-405(2). That Subsection states: 
The person using force or deadly force in 
defense of habitation is presumed for the 
purpose of both civil and criminal cases 
to have acted reasonably and had a reasonable 
fear of imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury if the entry or attempted 
entry is unlawful and is made or attempted 
by use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous 
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or 
for the purpose of committing a felony. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of State in 
Interest of R.J.Z., 736 P.2d 235 (Utah 1987), held that by adding 
Subsection (2), the legislature intended a legal presumption of 
reasonableness whenever an entry is "unlawful" and "made or 
attempted by use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
or surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose of 
committing a felony." The Court further held that a finding as 
to whether the entry was unlawful and forcible is essential to 
the proper application of Section 76-2-405, and remanded the case 
for factual findings as to whether the entry into R.J.Z.'s home 
was unlawful and forcible, or otherwise qualifies under Section 
76-2-405(2) for a legal presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 
236. In other words, Subsection (2), in the immediate case, 
provides a sound legal defense for the defendant's conduct. The 
essence of this case is the propriety of the defense of 
habitation. 
In the case at bar, trial counsel did not argue that 
the entry was unlawful or forcible and did not pursue a finding 
on that issue; did not request an instruction regarding the 
statutory presumption of reasonableness; and did not object to 
the instructions given, even though the defense of habitation 
instruction given did not reflect the 1985 amendment to 
Subsection (1). (Full text of defense of habitation and property 
instructions given set forth in Addendum). In light of the facts 
of this case, defendant contends that these specific omissions by 
trial counsel render his performance outside the range of 
professionally competent assistance. 
To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, the 
Defendant must show that trial counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. ^d. at 2064. This requires the 
defendant to show that a "reasonable probability" exists that, 
but for counsel's error, the result would have been different. 
Frame at 405. A reasonable probability has been defined as that 
"sufficient to undermine the confidence in the reliability of the 
verdict." State v. Lariby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1204-06 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant contends that there is indeed a reasonable 
probability in this case that, but for counsel's error, the 
result in this case would have been different. 
In State in Interest of R.J.Z., (supra), the Supreme 
Court of Utah noted that: 
the first step in deciding whether any defendant 
is justified under section 76-2-405 is to determine 
what burden of proof the defendant and the State 
are respectively required to carry. It is impossible 
to allocate the burden of proof without first 
determining whether the defendant is entitled to 
the statutory presumption. 
Id. at 237. 
Therefore, it follows that for the statute to be 
properly applied, a determination as to the nature and legality 
of Olsen's entry into the defendant's home is required in 
determining whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of a 
legal presumption. Trial counsel did not request that this be 
done, either by instruction or by argument, even though this 
defense is central to the defendant's case. 
The failure of trial counsel in this action is 
distinguishable from the general complaints about counsel in 
Frame, supra, and in State v. Pursifell, 72 U.A.R. 38 (Utah App. 
1987). In those cases, the defendants1 complaints about their 
respective attorneys1 performance were general and were found not 
to be prejudicial to the defense. However, the allegations of 
error are specific and substantial in this case, and constitute 
the heart of the defense. The proper resolution of the case was 
impossible without the statutory defense and specific 
instructions regarding the presumption. e.g., R.J.Z., supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Frame, supra, noted that the 
principles applied in evaluating ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are guides to the ultimate focus on the 
fundamental fairness of Defendant's trial. The Court stated that 
"the purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that defendant 
receives a fair trial." Id., at 405. Here, the defendant asserts 
that his counsel's critical omissions regarding the central 
issues of his defense denied him the right to effective 
assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Article 
I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The conviction of the defendant for aggravated assault 
should be vacated and this case should be remanded to the 
district court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 1988. 
N. PAPPAS 
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ADDENDUM 
f76-2-405. Utah Code Ann. 
Force in defense of habitation. 
(1) A person is justified in using force against 
another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that 
the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's 
unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation; however, he is 
justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and 
tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he 
reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made for the 
purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any 
person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he reasonably 
believes that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or 
attempted for the purpose of committing a felony in the 
habitation and that the force is necessary to prevent the 
commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense 
of habitation is presumed for the purpose of both civil and 
criminal cases to have acted reasonably and had a reasonable fear 
of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry 
or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of 
force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously 
or by stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony. 
#76-2-406. Utah Code Ann. 
Force in defense of property. 
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly 
force, against another when and to the extent that he reasonably 
believes that force is necessary to prevent or terminate criminal 
interference with real property or personal property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) Lawfully in the possession of a member of his 
immediate family; or 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property he has a 
legal duty to protect. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that a person is justified in 
threatening or using force against another person when and to the 
extent he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself against other such person's imminent use of such 
unlawful force; however, a person is justified in using force 
which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury only if he reasonably believes that the force is necessary 
to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself. 
Actual danger is not necessary to justify self-defense 
if one is confronted by the appearance of peril which arouses in 
his mind an honest and reasonable conviction and fear that he is 
about to suffer death or great bodily harm and if a reasonable 
man in a like situation, seeing and knowing the same facts, would 
be justified in believing himself in such danger. 
If a person so confronted acts in self-defense upon 
such appearance and from such fear or honest conviction, his 
right to self-defense is the same whether such danger is real or 
apparent. 
Now, you will note that such fear and apprehension must 
be honest and reasonable in light of all of the circumstances, 
and to justify the right of self-defense not only must a person 
act on facts and circumstances that he himself believes place him 
in deadly peril of his life or receiving great bodily harm, but 
also that a reasonable man if in the same situation would 
likewise be justified in believing himself in such danger. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person is justified in the use of force against 
another which is intended or likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury when and to the extent that he reasonably believes 
that the force that is necessary to prevent the other's unlawful 
entry into or attack upon his habitation, but only if, (a), the 
entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously or by stealth and he reasonably believes the 
entry is made for the purpose of assaulting or offering any 
violence to any person dwelling or being in the habitation and he 
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the 
assault or offer of personal violence, or (b), he reasonably 
believes that the entry is made or attempted for the purpose of 
committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You1re instructed that the laws of the State of Utah do 
not require a defendant to establish self-defense or defense of 
habitation by preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. 
The laws of the State of Utah require the defendant to bring 
forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense. 
If the defendant has done this and if such evidence of 
self-defense, when considered in connection with all other 
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to whether 
the defendant acted in self-defense, you may acquit him of the 
charge of aggravated assault. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person who is 
lawfully in possession of real property or personal property or 
who has a duty to protect such property which belongs to someone 
else may not use force against another which is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury to said other person in order to 
prevent or terminate that person's interference with such 
property. 
